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TRIBES AND
Tribulatbns
The West expected that the fall o f the Najibullah regime 
would bring peace to Afghanistan. It did nothing o f the 
sort: the country is still in turmoil. Mihail Konarovsky 
examines the complex ethnic roots of the continuing
conflict.
ince the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union in late 1991, the unresolved 
problems and ambitions of its con- 
  stituent republics have posed ever 
more complicated challenges to the emerging 
multipolar world order.
S
The newly independent Central Asian states, which have 
close ethnic, cultural, and religious ties with neighbouring 
Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan (as well as, to some extent, 
with Pakistan), have embarked on active foreign policy 
aimed at establishing comprehensive contacts with the 
region, against the background of growing Turkish and 
Islamic sentiment. Clearly, the decline of the USSR has 
exerted a crucial influence on developments in Afghanistan 
in particular.
The withdrawal of Soviet troops by March 1989, and the 
1991 understanding with Washington to stop supplying
arms to rival parties, marked the end of Soviet support for 
the Najibullah regime— and this, in turn, determined the 
fate of his government. In late April 1992 it fell, and the 
country was proclaimed an Islamic republic. But the ques­
tion of whether the long period of instability and in­
tolerance has really come to an end remains open. Indeed, 
the ambiguous and controversial developments there since 
the mujahideen seized power could be seen as indicating 
merely that the country has entered a new power struggle, 
this time among the mujahideen themselves.
The first step taken by the new regime was the comprehen­
sive Islamicisation of the country's political, social, and 
cultural life. Such a policy seems to be logical since the 'holy 
war' against the 'infidel' marxist regime and the Soviet 
occupation was the main political and ideological core of 
the mujahideen struggle which kept the otherwise separate 
and unco-ordinated groups together.
Today's leaders in Kabul are likely to continue regarding 
comprehensive Islamicisation as the basis of political con­
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solidation while they attempt to solve the urgent economic 
and social problems which might prevent the country be­
coming involved in regional integration. Ties with neigh­
bouring Pakistan, as well as Iran and rich Arab nations 
(especially Saudi Arabia)—the countries which had sup­
ported the mujahideen movement over more than a 
decade—are considered to be the most important factor in 
overcoming the bitter consequences of civil war.
At the same time, the country's history indicates that Islam, 
while an important element, may not be the crucial one in 
determining further developments there. Rather, the inter­
relationship of the various ethnic groups in the country is 
likely to be the main factor influencing the future alignment 
of the various political forces.
The pillars of mujahideen unity over the last 14 years 
crumbled swiftly after the 1988 Geneva accords which laid 
down the schedule for withdrawal of the Soviet troops. 
After the last Soviet soldier left Afghanistan in February 
1989, the rebels' mutual suspicion and distrust turned into 
open hostility. Bloody clashes broke out among various 
factions, principally between supporters of Ahmad Shah 
Masoud (who was identified with the minorities' move­
ment) and G Hekmatyar (the most powerful and irrecon­
cilable leader of the militant Pushtun majority) despite the 
enormous efforts of Pakistan and Iran to unify them. That 
fact largely secured the survival of the Najibullah govern­
ment over the last three years despite the gradual decrease 
in Soviet support. With the downfall of the regime, how­
ever, the last strand of mujahideen unity disappeared.
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Although submerged by the war against the Soviets, con­
frontation between the Pushtun (Afghan) majority (about 
6.5 million strong, with traditional roots in the south and 
south-west), and the Tajik (3.5 million) and Uzbek (about 
one million) minorities of the North, as well as Hazara 
(about one million) Shiite muslims in the western and 
central parts have, over decades, been at the core of the 
country's domestic problems. The political map of Af­
ghanistan has been shaped by the territorial expansion of 
the Pushtuns from the south and south-east to the north. It 
was their tribes which laid the cornerstone of the first 
centralised Afghan state in the mid-18th century, and 
which (in 1919) proclaimed the restoration of the country's 
independence from British rule. That fact traditionally en­
sured the Pushtun's key positions in the country's political 
and military hierarchy. Migration to the northern and 
central areas was aimed at enhancing their political and 
economic influence.
But, against that background, the Tajiks, Uzbeks and, to 
some extent, Hazaras remained ascendant in economic and 
cultural spheres bolstered by massive flows of ethnically 
kindred refugees from Russian Turkestan and the Bokhara 
Emirate in the 1920s and 1930s. The Tajiks are heirs to 
centuries-old Iranian material culture, such as settled farm­
ing, trade and handicrafts as well as classic literature and 
fine arts. Experience has urged the Pushtuns towards as­
similation with them, resulting in the gradual emergence 
of the Pushtun-Tajik 'marriage of convenience'. The Push­
tuns saw this as a way of obtaining a more advanced 
economic position, while the Tajiks sought to bring into 
reality long-standing ambitions to increase the extent of 
their role in the country's politics. However, the process 
failed to lead to the emergence of any kind of unified 
national state.
Ethnic suspicions have also consistently hampered the 
development of any nationwide political movements. The 
official 1960s doctrine of Afghaniyat (a united and in­
divisible Afghan nation) was the basic model for President 
Daud's Party of National Revolution. But its slogans failed 
to unite the country, not so much because of anxiety about 
the growth of strong political associations, but more as the 
result of strong opposition from minorities. The inability 
of the leftwing Watan party( which split into two main 
Pushtun and Tajik factions) to overcome nationalistic 
prejudices, bedevilled it from the moment of its formation 
in the mid-1960s. None of the factions could overcome 
ethnic differences even after they overthrew Daud in April 
1978.
The growing role of ethnic minorities in Afghanistan's 
politics after 1978 parallelled the revival of Islam as a 
reaction to the pro-communist coup. The new constitution 
drawn up after 1978 proclaimed for the first time the 
equality of all nationalities, ethnic groups and tribes. But 
the scope to turn these slogans into reality remained ex­
tremely limited in the face of a society divided fundamen­
tally along ethnic lines. Marxism and the comprehensive 
Soviet efforts to unite the country failed. But the same was 
also true of the opposition since all the principal 
mujahideen groups were largely based on ethnic identity. 
The Tajik-dominated movement under Ahmad Shah Mas-
soud in the north, politically bolstered by the Jamiiat-e-Is- 
lami party in Peshawar, has never identified with the 
Pakistan-based Pushtun resistance of the south and south- 
w est, nor with the Iran-oriented groups of Shiite 
mujahideen in the central and western provinces.
The rise of minority consciousness was also inevitably 
influenced by the dramatic changes in the world and in the 
region after the end of the Cold War—including, of course, 
the unprecedented eruption of nationalist movements. The 
emergence of independent nation states from the former 
Soviet republics on the other side of Afghanistan's north­
ern borders, and the revival of their historical, religious and 
ethnic identity had a direct impact on developments in 
Afghanistan. At the same time, mujahideen from the 
country's northern provinces have attempted to exert their 
own influence on the unfolding events in Central Asia. 
Openly inciting the revival of radical Islam there, 
Afghanistan's mujahideen have established direct’ ties 
with new Islamic movements in neighbouring Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan.
If ethnic confrontation worsens in post-Najibullah Af­
ghanistan, the country is unlikely not only to be able to 
restore peace, but even to maintain its unified nationhood 
in the long run. But it is quite obvious that the Tajiks, 
Uzbeks and other minorities will not abandon their aim of 
maintaining strong positions in the north and west in order 
to bargain with Kabul for a new status for their region, 
more independent of any central power than in the past.
The objectives of the Pushtuns' shaky alliances are more 
complicated. While they hope to regain their traditional 
predominance both in the Afghan state and, as far as 
possible, over the whole country, such goals are unat­
tainable at present. Sooner or later they will be forced to 
accept a new alignment of forces in the country and will 
have to make concessions. Whatever those concessions are, 
they have to be reciprocated. Today's rivals must meet each 
other halfway in order to prevent a territorial split which 
would inevitably have a serious impact on regional 
stability.
For the foreseeable future, Afghanistan is unlikely to have 
a nationwide leader who could consolidate all ethnic 
groups and resolve differences between them. Instead, the 
situation seems to be moving to the brink of a crisis. The 
most probable future scenario for the country will be the 
coexistence of a reasonably weak central power with the 
broad influence of local leaders in their respective provin­
ces. The main task of the central government in this situa­
tion would be the prevention of the physical disintegration 
of the country, an event which would be extremely unwel­
come for Afghanistan's immediate neighbours, but which 
cannot be ruled out. The wisest course of action for the 
mujahideen would be to form a compromise central 
government, which might control finance, defence and 
foreign relations, but to devolve broad economic and cul­
tural powers to provinces or national enclaves. Following 
the Lebanese experiment, power-sharing might allow for 
a Pushtun president and a Tajik prime minister, with 
proportional ethnic representation in the legislature.
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Foreign influences will clearly have a major say in whether 
such a desirable situation comes about. During the war, the 
main outside players were, on the one hand, the USSR and, 
on the other, Pakistan, the USA, Iran and Saudi Arabia. But 
in the new regional and global circumstances, neither 
Washington nor Moscow is likely to play a critical role in 
Afghanistan. The United States lost interest after the Soviet 
withdrawal, and returned to its traditional view on Af­
ghanistan as a nation of little political and economic sig­
nificance, and certainly not one of vital interest. Instead, 
Washington 'discovered' Central Asia for the first time.
At the same time, Russia, which has inherited the bulk of 
vvhat remains of the former USSR's foreign policy, is now 
preoccupied with its own enormous economic and social 
problems, and with clearing up its relations with its new 
neighbours, including those in Central Asia. The long-term 
policy toward Kabul will most probably be determined by 
Russia's relations with the Central Asian nations, as well as 
with Iran and Pakistan. Moscow is now politically as well 
as both geographically distant from Afghanistan.
Afghanistan's immediate neighbours such as Pakistan, 
Iran, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan will play more significant 
roles. None of them is likely to be interested in exacerbating 
ethnic friction in the country. An increase in separatist 
sentiments in the north will inevitably result in a turbulent 
upsurge of Pushtun nationalism all over Afghanistan and 
demands for revenge. Against that background, old 
demands to create a 'united Pushtunistan' on both sides of 
the Afghan-Pakistan border might appear on the agenda 
again. This traditional source of conflict between the two 
countries, despite having been significantly decreased over 
years of war in Afghanistan, nevertheless remains a latent 
cause of tension between Kabul and Islamabad.
If such sentiments deepen, the situation in Pakistan's 
North-West Frontier Province would be seriously ag­
gravated, causing general instability throughout the 
country. Islamabad does not need to be reminded of its own 
bitter experience in dealing with Peshawar-based Pushtun 
mujahideen and three million refugees from Afghanistan. 
With Pakistan increasingly preoccupied with its own 
policy towards Central Asia—aimed, among other things, 
at strengthening its political credibility in regional competi­
tion with India—any new imbalances on the western flanks 
Would be regarded as unacceptable in Islamabad. On the 
other hand, to forestall events Pakistan might reanimate the 
four-decade old doctrine of confederation with Afghanis­
tan, but now attempting to embrace only that country's 
Pushtun areas. But in the long run such an attempt seems 
certain to put a new time-bomb under Pakistani domestic 
stability.
Neither is Iran likely to be interested in becoming 
embroiled in impending ethnic quarrels in Afghanistan 
either. Nevertheless, to ensure its political presence there, 
Tehran will strongly insist that the Hazara Shiia minority 
°f the central and western regions be incorporated into 
Soviernmental structures. If ethnic intolerance gains 
Momentum, Tehran, which traditionally considers these 
Parts of Afghanistan to be within its sphere of influence,
might not be able to avoid the temptation of strengthening 
its ties with Shiite muslim parties which have been fostered 
and fed by Iran over more than a decade. The 
predominance of Tajiks who are culturally close to Iran in 
the north, and Hazaras (who are close to Tehran religious­
ly) in the central and western parts, might in the long run 
fuse together Iranian political ambitions both in Afghanis­
tan and Tajikistan.
Uzbekistan (the largest and potentially the most powerful 
of Afghanistan's neighbours to the north) as well as Tajikis­
tan and Turkmenistan—all with populations kindred to 
those in the north of Afghanistan—are preoccupied in 
dealing with economic crises, maintaining their own 
domestic harmony, and deepening newly established rela­
tions with Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. Their governments' 
grave concern over the possible disintegration of Afghanis­
tan is evident. But if a split did seem to be on the cards, 
Central Asia would necessarily be involved in the process 
as well, however reluctantly. Nationalistic and religious 
factions in the republics may voice support for such move­
ments so as to strengthen their own positions at home.
Uncertainties in Afghanistan might simultaneously ag­
gravate interregional relations in Central Asia as a whole. 
Tajiks in Afghanistan will inevitably continue to keep an 
eye on Tajikistan as a potential ally both for enhancing their 
traditional ambitions in Afghanistan, and in case of wor­
sening relations with the country's Turkic Uzbek and 
Turkmen populations. For its part, Uzbekistan, with a 
larger population (17 million) than Afghanistan's (15 mil­
lion) is unlikely to refrain from backing its ethnic brothers 
in an emergency. Pan-Turkic ideals, which have deep roots 
in Afghanistan as well, will only exacerbate this process. 
Hence, the new challenges in Afghanistan will become the 
first test for Central Asian republics in dealing with 
regional affairs.
To prevent such bitter scenarios being played out in post- 
Najibullah Afghanistan and its neighbours, all the regional 
players need to demonstrate maximum discretion and co­
operation in their actions. Economic and financial assis­
tance might be the main leverage for them in Afghanistan's 
affairs. That country's future admission to regional 
economic associations would certainly help. But the 
country is unlikely to be restored without massive interna­
tional aid. Any such assistance should be administered 
only by the central government, so that it may be effectively 
monitored by the UN. Neither the USA nor Russia, despite 
the heavy burden of its transition towards a market 
economy, can afford to stand aside from such a process.
These two policy streams— domestic and regional— might 
together promote a peaceful outcome of the impending 
crises in Afghanistan. If they are not successfully imple­
mented, however, the future Afghanistan could easily be­
come the detonator in a deteriorating situation in post-Cold 
War Asia.
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